The Afghanistan Offer that Under no circumstances Transpired

Does McKenzie imagine the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a mistake? Sure – but it wasn’t his determination to make.

“My perception is we really should have stayed. I think that everything that happened flowed from that fundamental decision,” states McKenzie, who retired from the armed forces on April 1. “My recommendation was that we continue to keep a compact presence where by we could preserve a amount of assist for the Afghans. That was not the guidance that was taken.”

This interview has been edited for size and clarity.

Seligman: It is the 7 days ahead of Kabul falls. What is taking place? What are you imagining? Established the scene for me.

McKenzie: In the final official intelligence assessment I despatched up on the 8th of August, I said, ‘It is my judgment that Kabul is heading to tumble.’ I did not believe it was heading to slide that weekend. I believed it could very last a minor bit lengthier, 30 times or so. But I felt Kabul would be surrounded in the speedy brief phrase.

On Thursday or Friday, I received the course to go to Doha to discuss to the Taliban. What we desired was about a 30-kilometer exclusion zone: You fellas stay out of there when we do the evacuation. And if you remain out of there, we will not strike you any where in Afghanistan.

I received on the plane on Sunday morning. Although I was on the plane about, I was finding studies that the Taliban is in downtown Kabul, they’ve really overrun the city. By the time I met with them, they experienced substantial forces within the town. So I reported, ‘Look, we can continue to have a resolution right here. We’re going to carry out an evacuation. If you don’t interfere with the evacuation, we won’t strike.’

Mullah Baradar claimed, off the cuff, ‘Why never you arrive in and protected the metropolis?’ But that was just not feasible. It would have taken me putting in an additional division to do that. And I feel that was a flippant remark. And now we know in the fullness of time that Mullah Baradar wasn’t essentially speaking for the tricky-line Taliban. I do not know if he could have sent, even if he was serious about it.

I felt in my very best judgment that it wasn’t a genuine present. And it was not a realistic military services operation. Which is why they pay back me, that’s why I’m there.

By and large, the Taliban ended up helpful in our departure. They did not oppose us. They did do some external security work. There was a downside of that exterior safety function, and it probably prevented some Afghans from acquiring to Kabul airport as we would have preferred. But that was a danger that I was keen to operate.

Seligman: So after Kabul fell, the evacuation started. What took place next?

McKenzie: The future day, Aug. 16 it was my plan to fly to Kabul. But the airfield, the runway, was overrun by people coming in from the south. It took us about 16 several hours to provide that under management — a mix of us, the Afghan commandos and the Taliban. We experienced 400 Taliban fighters beating folks with sticks. It’s not what you want, but you are in the land of undesirable alternatives now. It let the commander on the floor regain handle of the airfield, and we in no way lost command all over again right after that. But that was surely intense.